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COMMENTS
RETIREMENT EQUITY INACTION: DnqSION OF PENSION BENEFITS UPON
DIVORCE IN LOUISIANA
In 1984 Congress enacted the Retirement Equity Act (REA) to
"improve the delivery of retirement benefits and provide for greater
equity under private pension plans for workers and their spouses and
dependents by taking into account changes in work patterns, the status
of marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial contribution
to that partnership of spouses who work both in and outside the home
.... '" REA amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) which had been enacted to "provide for pension
reform." '2 The relevant substantive provisions of REA were preserved
under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, subject to clarification and am-
plification.'
The purpose of this paper is to review recent Louisiana court de-
cisions which have addressed the issue of division of pension plan benefits
upon divorce. The paper will suggest methods of division and distribution
of such benefits that will better protect the interest of the non-employee
spouse. 4
The scope of this paper is limited to the division and distribution
of benefits from a tax-qualified, private plan.' Insofar as government
and military pension plans are both subject to their owh complex reg-
ulatory schemes, 6 they are more logically the subject of a separate
Copyright 1988, LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1985).
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1975).
3. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1987). See generally
Practising Law Institute, Introduction to Qualified Pension and Profit Sharing Plans After
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1987).
4. Since most non-employee spouses currently claiming pension benefits upon divorce
are women, this article will use the words "she" and "her" when referring to the non-
employee spouse. However, in the future as more women enter the work force and become
vested in pension benefits, it will no longer be assumed that the non-employee spouse
receiving benefits upon divorce is a woman.
5. I.R.C. § 401(a) (Supp. 1987).
6. Civil Service Retirement plans ("government plans") are governed by provisions
codified at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 8331-8351, 8401-8470 (Supp. 1987). Military Retirement plans
are governed by provisions codified at 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1221, 1251, 1263, 1275, 1293,
1305, 1315 (1983 & Supp. 1987).
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inquiry. This paper will, however, include discussion of some Louisiana
cases involving government or military plans to the extent that those
decisions have been incorporated into Louisiana's jurisprudentially cre-
ated "pension doctrine."
Recent Louisiana court decisions indicate that the two supreme court
decisions of T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery' and Sims v. Sims8 have
become enshrined as a pension doctrine. Almost all subsequent decisions
have relied upon T.L. James to hold that the benefits are community
property and upon Sims to determine the community interest portion
due to the non-employee spouse.
It is important that courts analyze distinctions among pension plans
rather than routinely apply the pension doctrine. Such analysis will
indicate that benefits in some instances have a determinate value that
could easily be distributed to the non-employee spouse upon divorce.
I. PENSION TERMINOLOGY
"Pension plan" is defined by ERISA: "[Tihe terms 'employee pen-
sion benefit plan' and 'pension plan' mean any plan ... maintained
by an employer .. . that ... provides retirement income to employees
''9
There are several types of private pension plans.' 0 A defined benefit
pension plan provides a participant with definitely determinable benefits
upon attaining retirement age. For example, a plan may provide that
upon retirement a participant will receive annually an amount equal to
the sum of 2% of his annual compensation for his total years of
employment. If an employee works for 25 years at a salary of $10,000
per year, he will receive a benefit of $5,000-$200 X 25-per year after
retirement.
Employer contributions to a defined benefit pension plan are de-
termined annually based on actuarial assumptions, including pre-retire-
ment interest, post-retirement interest, salary scale, employee turnover,
mortality after retirement, future increases in Social Security benefits
(with which private plan benefits are often integrated), number of married
participants, and administrative expenses." Once an employer establishes
7. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
8. 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
9. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(2)(A) (Supp. 1987).
10. See generally J. Mamorskey, Employee Benefits Handbook (1987); Practising Law
Institute, supra note 3; Canan, 8 West's Legal Forms, Retirement Plans with Tax Analysis
(1983).
11. Practising Law Institute, supra note 3, at 302-03.
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a defined benefit plan he is obligated to fund the plan, which usually
requires an annual contribution. 2
Alternatively, an employer may define the contribution he will make
every year to each participant's "retirement account." Profit sharing
plans and money purchase pension plans are examples of the defined
contribution pension plan. A profit sharing plan is the simplest type of
retirement plan. The employer may, at its election, contribute an amount
annually to the profit sharing fund. The amount contributed may be
determined either by a set formula or annually by the employer man-
agement. 3 Once the money is within the profit sharing fund, it is
allocated to the participants' accounts according to a formula set in the
plan document. Such formula is usually based on the proportion of a
particular participant's compensation to that of all participants. For
example, if an employer contributes $10,000 to a fund and a participant
earns $20,000 per year when total participant salaries are $200,000 for
that year, then 100 of the fund, $1,000, will be allocated to the
participant's account. The allocation formula sometimes is adjusted for
such factors as participant age or years of service.
A money purchase plan is considered a pension plan because the
employer is obligated to fund it once it is established. It is classified
as a defined contribution plan because the employer annually contributes
a set amount to the plan. The plan is similar to a profit sharing plan
in that the contributions are allocated to discreet, named, participant
accounts. A vested participant's interest in the fund is equivalent to his
account balance.14
Three distinct pension concepts are often confused: vesting, accrual
of benefits, and maturity. Vesting is the process by which a participant's
right in his accrued benefit becomes nonforfeitable. 5
Accrual of benefits is the process by which benefits earned are
credited to a participant's "account."' 6 For a defined contribution plan
(a profit sharing or money purchase pension plan) a participant's accrued
benefit is equal to his account balance.' The concept of benefit accrual
is more complex for a defined benefit plan. The Internal Revenue Code
12. I.R.C. § 412 (Supp. 1987).
13. Practising Law Institute, Introduction to Qualified Pension and Profit Sharing
Plans 110 (1984).
14. Id. at 126-28.
15. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053(a), 1002(19) (Supp. 1987).
16. I.R.C. § 411(2)(7) (1987); S. Kraus & R. Keschner, The Pension Answer Book
68 (3d ed. 1984); Practising Law Institute, supra note 3, at 289-95.
17. For example, if an employer has a money purchase pension plan with a contri-
bution formula of 10% of compensation and a vesting schedule of 207o per year, after
one year of participation, a participant with an annual compensation of $30,000 will have
an accrued benefit of $3,000 and vested benefit of $600.
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prescribes three acceptable methods by which a participant's benefits
can accrue.' The methods do not require that a participant accrue
benefits at the same rate from year to year. A plan can be funded on
a "frontloaded" basis, which simply means that a participant accrues
his whole benefit early in his employment history.' 9 The allowable meth-
ods, however, limit the amount of "backloading" of benefit accruals. 20
"Benefit maturity" is a jurisprudentially created concept. "The word
'matured' has no recognized meaning within the technical language of
private pension plans. It is simply a term adopted by the judiciary to
represent the date on which the benefit payments are to commence. '21
There are two main categories of benefits that may be payable upon
the death of a participant-a death benefit and a survivor annuity. A
death benefit refers to the proceeds of an insurance policy which is
purchased through the pension plan. 22 In order for a plan to maintain
its tax-qualified status, insurance proceeds provided by the plan's death
benefit must be "incidental.- 21 Pension plan death benefits can be used
for two purposes. First, some plans are funded through insurance con-
tracts so that upon retirement of the participant, his policy will be
converted to cash and used to pay his retirement benefit. Second, a
death benefit can be a lagniappe provided in addition to a participant's
accrued benefit should he die before retirement.
A survivor annuity is a benefit provided for the remaining life of
a beneficiary who is predeceased by the participant. The survivor annuity
is automatically provided and is presumed payable to the participant's
surviving spouse. 24 The participant can designate a beneficiary other than
his spouse only upon informed, written spousal consent witnessed by a
notary public or plan representative. 25 Survivor annuities are automat-
ically provided in the case of death of a defined benefit or money
purchase pension plan participant. They do not usually apply to profit
18. I.R.C. § 411(b)(l)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1987).
19. Frontloading allows an employer to realize large tax savings for the years during
which it is funding a plan on a frontloaded basis.
20. Taken to the extreme, an employer might want to backload plan funding to the
extent of not having an employee "accrue" his benefit (and the employer would therefore
not have to fund it) until the employee's last year of employment. Under this scheme,
a 30-year employee earning $50,000 could be fully vested in his benefit, but have no
accrued benefit insofar as the employer was planning to fund it all the year before his
retirement. In other words, the employee's fully vested benefit would amount to nothing.
21. Brown, Berry v. Berry and the Division of Pension Benefits in Divorce and Post-
Judgment Partition Action, 13 Community Prop. J. 30, 33 (April 1986).
22. Practising Law Institute, supra note 3, at 122; Canan, supra note 9, at 68-70.
23. Practising Law Institute, supra note 3, at 122; Canan, supra note 9, at 68-70.
24. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1055 (Supp. 1987).
25. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1055(c)(2) (Supp. 1987).
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sharing plans, because a participant's account balance is usually im-
mediately payable to his surviving spouse in the event of death. If other
benefit options are available, however, the surviving spouse will auto-
matically receive survivor annuity coverage.
There are two primary methods of dividing pension benefits upon
divorce: the "present cash value method" and the "reserved jurisdiction
method". The Arizona Supreme Court succinctly contrasted the two
methods.
[Under] the 'present cash value method,' ... the court deter-
mines the community interest in the pension, figures the present
cash value of that interest, and awards half of that amount to
the non-employee spouse in a lump sum, usually in the form
of equivalent property; the employee thus receives the entire
pension right free of community ties. Under the 'reserved ju-
risdiction method,' the court determines the formula for division
at the time of the decree but delays the actual division until
payments are received, retaining jurisdiction to award the ap-
propriate percentage of each pension payment if, as, and when,
it is paid out. 26
The reserved jurisdiction approach is appropriate where assigning a
current value to a benefit would be highly speculative, as where a younger
participant is involved in a defined benefit plan. The present cash value
method is appropriate where the benefit is presently determinable.
II. STATUTORY REGIME
Preemption
Although ERISA has a broad preemption clause,27 its provisions
have not been found to conflict with Louisiana community property
principles. Louisiana has consistently recognized pension benefits as a
community asset, and the division of this asset upon divorce is not
defeated by ERISA.28 In United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Meyers, the
federal district court stated that ERISA "does not preempt the laws of
26. Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 41, 638 P.2d 705, 708 (1981).
27. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (Supp. 1987).
28. "Demands for efficient and expeditious settlement under these plans cannot out-
weigh or have the effect of nullifying the strongly entrenched and viable community
property system existing in this State. . . . [Niothing in the community property system
is found which encumbers or deters the operation of the plans before us." T.L. James
& Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 844 (La. 1976). See also Sims v. Sims, 358 So.
2d 919, 921 (1978).
19881
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
Louisiana on community property. ,29 The court evaluated the legislation
and stated that congressional intent "would not be thwarted by allowing
a former spouse to assert her community interest in a retirement fund.
In fact, the policy of the marital regimes laws is in harmony with the
general objectives of the Act." 30
REA further supports reliance on state domestic relations law, for
Congress specifically stated that ERISA's preemption provisions do not
apply to domestic relations orders as defined in the Act. 3 1 Congress,
however, did enact detailed procedures for recognizing a spouse's and
an ex-spouses's rights to pension benefits pursuant to a Qualified Do-
mestic Relations Order (QDRO).3 2 As a result, states must act in ac-
cordance with certain rules mandated by REA, but are free to afford
spouses greater protection pursuant to their own laws.
In most cases involving division of pension benefits upon divorce,
Louisiana courts allocate community assets and liabilities according to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801.3 The statute provides a procedure
that may be instituted by either spouse for dividing the community
property when the spouses cannot agree to a division between themselves.
It provides in part:
The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so
that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.
The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all
of the community assets and liabilities. In allocating assets and
liabilities the court may divide a particular asset or liability
equally or unequally or may allocate it in its entirety to one of
the spouses.3 4
The statute also provides that the court may appoint experts to aid in
valuing the community assets. 35
Purpose and Key Provisions of REA
In 1984 Congress enacted REA in response to the perception that
"the provisions of ERISA are antiquated and need amending to afford
better protection to women. "36 Congress noted that seventy-two percent
29. 488 F. Supp. 704, 712 (M.D. La. 1980).
30. Id. at 711.
31. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(7) (1985 & Supp. 1987).
32. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3) (Supp. 1987)
33. La. R.S. 9:2801 (1983 & Supp. 1987).
34. La. R.S. 9:2801 (1983 & Supp. 1987).
35. La. R.S. 9:2801(3), (4)(b), (c) (Supp. 1987).
36. Pension Equity for Women: Hearings on H.R. 2100 Before the Subcommittee
on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings] (comments
of Chairman Clay).
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of the elderly poor are women3 7 and that in 1981 "10.5 percent of
women aged 65 and over were receiving private pension benefits ....
averag[ing] $2,427 a year ... (whereas) 27.7 percent of men in that
age group had pensions averaging almost twice as much." 3 In intro-
ducing her bill, the author stated,
[This] bill . . . is an attempt to improve the odds that women,
be they homemakers or women working outside the home, will
enjoy an old age of financial security .... Women are short-
changed by private pension plans because the system does not
truly recognize the contribution that women make to the econ-
omy or take into account women's unique work patterns, pat-
terns which revolve around child rearing and other family
responsibilities .... She is dependent on her husband and his
earnings and at the mercy of death or divorce.3 9
REA specifically benefits the older or divorced woman by requiring
that a qualified defined benefit or money purchase plan provide auto-
matic survivor benefits with regard to any vested participant."4 An au-
tomatic survivor benefit must also be provided by a profit sharing plan
if the full account balance is not immediately distributed. If a vested
participant4' dies after his annuity starting date, his accrued benefit is
automatically payable in the form of a qualified joint and survivor
(QJ&S) annuity. If a vested participant dies before his annuity starting
date, his accrued benefit is automatically payable to his surviving spouse
in the form of a qualified pre-retirement survivor (QPS) annuity. A
participant can elect to receive a benefit in a form other that a QJ&S
annuity or a QPS annuity, but only upon informed, written spousal
consent or the establishment "to the satisfaction of a plan representative
that ... there is no spouse." ' 42
The primary mechanism by which REA recognizes the pension rights
of an ex-spouse is pursuant to the rules established regarding Qualified
Domestic Relations Orders (QDRO's).4 3 A QDRO is a domestic relations
37. Hearings, supra note 36, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1983) (comments of Mr.
Smedley, Associated Director Dept. of Occupational Safety, Health & Social Security,
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations).
38. Hearings, supra note 36, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1983) (comments of Con-
gresswoman Ferraro).
39. Id.
40. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1055(a) (Supp. 1987).
41. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1055(h)(1) (Supp. 1987) defines a "vested participant" as "any
participant who has a nonforfeitable right ... to any portion of such participant's accrued
benefit." Therefore, the participant does not have to be fully vested before his spouse's
benefit is protected under survivor annuity provisions.
42. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1055(c)(1), (c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1987).
43. See supra note 32.
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order "made pursuant to a state domestic relations law (including a
community property law)" 4 which "creates or recognizes the existence
of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the
right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect
to a participant under a plan ' 45 and relates to the provision of "alimony
payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, [or] former spouse
"46
REA's QDRO provisions specifically provide for payment of a pen-
sion benefit to an ex-spouse (alternate payee) before the participant elects
to retire, but "on or after the date on which the participant attains
... earliest retirement age." '4 7 Such required payment before the par-
ticipant would elect to receive retirement benefits himself does not run
afoul of REA's proscriptions. Although a QDRO cannot require a plan
"to provide any type or form of benefit, or any option, not otherwise
provided under the plan ... [or] to provide increased benefits," 4 a
QDRO can require benefits to be paid to an alternate payee at the
earliest date on which the participant could retire and receive a benefit.
Interestingly, REA does specify that even if the QJ&S annuity is a form
of benefit provided by the plan, such form cannot be elected by the
ex-spouse, alternate payee. 49 Thus, an ex-spouse cannot opt to receive
her benefits in the form of a QJ&S annuity which would pay continued
benefits after her death, possibly to her new spouse.
Another key feature of REA's QDRO provisions is the ability to
treat a former spouse as a surviving spouse (and a surviving spouse as
a non-spouse) for purposes of the QJ&S annuity and the QPS annuity. 0
For example, this crucial provision would allow a judge in a situation
where spouses are divorcing at age forty to specify in the QDRO that
the ex-wife would be entitled to the participant's death benefit should
he die before retiring.
REA also addresses the importance of taxability of retirement plan
distributions to an alternate payee. REA specifically provides for an
alternate payee to make a tax-free rollover within one year to another
eligible retirement plan of certain plan distributions received pursuant
to a QDRO. 1
44. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(ll) (Supp. 1987).
45. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(l) (Supp. 1987).
46. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (Supp. 1987).
47. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(I) (Supp. 1987).
48. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(i), (ii) (Supp. 1987); also id. at 1056(d)(3)(E)(i), (ii).
49. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(I1l) (Supp. 1987).
50. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(F)(i) (Supp. 1987).
51. I.R.C. § 402(a)(6)(F) (Supp. 1987).
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III. LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE
In the 1976 case of T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 2 the Louis-
iana Supreme Court held that a husband's profit-sharing plan and benefit
pension plan proceeds were community property. 3 The plans involved
were both qualified, private pension plans within the meaning of I.R.C.
401(a). The case arose as a concursus proceeding 4 when, after the death
of the participant, the employer encountered conflicting claims to the
benefits from a former spouse, a spouse (in the process of seeking a
separation from the deceased participant at the time he committed
suicide), a child of the first marriage, and a child of the second marriage.
The court noted that the employer's contribution to the plans was
"not a purely gratuitous act, but in the nature of additional remuneration
.... "5" In evaluating the plan's ERISA-mandated anti-alienation pro-
visions, the court stated that "plans or devices between employer and
employee cannot have the effect of nullifying the wife's rights." '5 6 The
court noted, "[I]t seems apparent that the plans recognize the contri-
bution the wife makes to the employee's contentment, and the design
of the plan is to foster and encourage the employee's security." '5 7
Another important aspect of the T.L. James decision is the court's
rejection of an analogy of pension plan death benefits to life insurance
proceeds." The court's crucial assumption is that pension plan death
benefits are similar to "retirement or profit sharing funds." The court
thereby voided Mr. James' beneficiary designation for the pension plan
funds to the extent that the designation impinged on the spouse's com-
munity property interest. Although the first wife had not requested any
portion of the death benefit, the court stated: "Had she asserted any
claim, her community ownership rights to share in the funds would be
recognized on the basis of the contributions made to the funds during
the existence of the first community." 5 9 Such recognition of a pension
plan death benefit as a plan proceed would allow a court to recognize
an ex-spouse's interest in the survivor annuity or death benefit.
52. 332 So. 2d 834, 844, 850 (La. 1976).
53. The court stated: "[T]he plans ... represent compensation from the employer
to the employee .... " T.L. James, 332 So. 2d at 840. Such characterization results in
classification of the pension fund as community property as "property acquired during
the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse
. La. Civ. Code art. 2338.
54. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 4651-4652.
55. T.L. James, 332 So. 2d at 841.
56. Id. at 844.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 846, 852.
59. Id. at 856.
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Although the case of Sims v. Sims6° involved a federal employee
and therefore a government plan, it is a landmark decision in that the
Louisiana Supreme Court posited a formula for dividing pension benefits
upon divorce that has been applied in virtually all subsequent cases.
The formula assigns a definite value to the portion of the employee's
pension attributable to credited service during the existence of the com-
munity. 6'
In Sims, the husband had been employed for nineteen years and
five months as an air traffic controller at the time of dissolution of
the community; the parties had been married for twenty-nine years. The
husband subsequently became eligible to retire and receive an immediate
benefit upon attaining age fifty (after having completed twenty years of
service), two years before the Supreme Court ruled on the case. Although
the court states that "the plan is a 'defined benefit' plan," 62 such is
not precisely the case. As a government plan, the benefit is defined as
a percent of average pay, multiplied by years of service, 63 but unlike
ordinary defined benefit plans, the contribution level is also set as a
percent of basic pay. 64 This distinction is important because employer
contributions made during the existence of a community to such a plan
are definitely determinable, unlike those made to a defined benefit plan.
Therefore, it would be relatively easy to value the benefit at the time
of divorce.
In addition to the enunciation of a formula for apportioning re-
tirement benefits, the court in Sims made another far-reaching pro-
nouncement. The court noted that, although eligible to immediately retire
and receive a benefit (at the time of trial), the employee had elected
to continue his employment. The court thereby concluded:
[T]he community interest in the retirement plan has no immediate
redeemable cash value. Until the employee is separated from the
service, dies, retires or becomes disabled, no value can be fixed
upon his right to receive an annuity or upon lump-sum payments
or other benefits to be paid on his account. Nevertheless ...
the wife is entitled to a declaration at this time of the interest
60. 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
61. The formula is:
(Portion of pension attributable to creditable service during existence of com-
munity divided by Pension attributable to total creditable service) X (,/, X
annuity (or lump sum payment)).
Sims, 358 So. 2d at 924.
62. Id. at 924 n.5.
63. 5 U.S.C.A. § 8339(a) (1980 & Supp. 1987).
64. 5 U.S.C.A. § 8334 (Supp. 1987).
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attributable to the community of any such payments, if and
when they become due in the future.65
The court continued by noting that it was impossible to exactly
determine the amount to which the ex-wife would be entitled. The court
stated:
The community's dissolution before such date does not substitute
for the employee's retirement (or separation or death) as the
event which fixes the employer's liability and which causes pay-
ments to become due. When they do become due, however, so
as then to have a determinant value, the non-employed spouse
is entitled to receive the proportion of them recognized by this
judgment .... 66
Unfortunately, the court's effort to protect the interest of the ex-
spouse was largely ineffective, as Mr. Sims subsequently died before
retiring. 61 The court denied the ex-spouse an interest in Mr. Sims'
survivor annuity, awarding her instead a return of one-half of the
employee contributions made to the plan during the existence of the
community. Mr. Sims' spouse of four years (at the date of death) is
receiving the survivor annuity. 68
In two recent cases, Lovell v. Love169 and Michel v. Michel,70 the
first circuit has apportioned qualified, private pension plan benefits upon
divorce by referring to T.L. James and Sims without reference to REA
or the fact that Sims involved a federal employee.
Lovell involved a participant and his ex-spouse who were married
in 1961 and divorced in 1981. The district court entered judgment as
to partition of the community of acquets and gains in November, 1984
(after the effective date of REA). One of the primary assets of the
community was the fully-vested interest in the husband's employer's
profit sharing plan. Unfortunately, the court does not indicate the hus-
band's age, years of company service, or the early or normal retirement
ages stated in the plan. However, given the parties' marriage date (1961)
65. Sims, 358 So. 2d at 923 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 924.
67. Mr. Sims was fifty-four years old and had accrued twenty-nine years of creditable
service at the time of his death. He was thus eligible to retire and receive an immediate
benefit. He had not done so, however, so his benefits never became payable within the
court's contemplation of that phrase.
68. Matter of Succession of Sims, 464 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985). Sims
involved a government plan. Civil Service REA (Pub. L. No. 98-615, 98 Stat. 3195) was
passed the same year as REA and contained many parallel provisions. The case addresses
the issues of preemption of state law and retroactive application of the act.
69. 490 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 495 So. 2d 302 (1986).
70. 484 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
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and the value of the husband's profit sharing plan (balance of $128,697.35
as of the date of termination of the community), one can assume that
Mr. Lovell was a middle-aged, highly compensated employee. Feasibly,
at the time of decision he was eligible for early retirement. Nevertheless,
the court of appeal cited T.L. James and Sims to overrule the trial
court's assignment of a definite value to the profit sharing plan at the
time of dissolution of the community.
Although the court took notice of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2801 directive that the assets be valued as of the time of trial,7' the
court refused to actually value the profit sharing plan benefit since Mr.
Lovell was still employed. The court stated: "The value cannot be set
with a degree of precision consonant with the requirements imposed
upon us as a court of justice .... [T]he courts are constrained by
T.L. James & Co., and Sims not to attempt to set a present value upon
the profit sharing plan."'7 2 In declining to assign a value to Mr. Lovell's
vested plan benefit, the court did not consider the particular profit
sharing plan characteristics that make it susceptible of accurate valuation.
The funds for participants are held in named accounts. As mentioned
above, if a profit sharing plan participant dies before retiring, his
beneficiary is paid the account balance (this is true even if the account
had previously been non-vested or partially vested-full vesting is au-
tomatic upon death). If the participant terminates employment on or
after normal retirement age, or if he terminates because of total and
permanent disability (regardless of whether he had been previously vested),
or if he terminates after achieving full vesting at any time for any
reason (regardless of any stated early or normal retirement ages in the
plan), the participant will receive his account balance. What the par-
ticipant does forego is any future contributions that he or his employer
might have made to his account by virtue of his continued employment.
In summary, the value of the community portion of Mr. Lovell's
profit sharing plan is set upon dissolution of the community. 73 There
is no public policy served by requiring the non-employee ex-spouse to
wait until the employee retires, dies or separates from service before
she can receive her interest, when her interest is presently definitely
determinable. Indeed, as discussed below, there is strong public policy
to be served by allowing the ex-spouse a current realization of her
interest whenever feasible.
The Michel case is a second example of the court's rigid adherence
to the precedent set by T.L. James and Sims. In Michel the parties had
71. La. R.S. 9:2801 (4)(a) (1983).
72. Lovell, 490 So. 2d at 332.
73. See M. Canan & D. Baker, Qualified Retirement Plans § 3.11 (1987).
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been married for twenty-five years before the judgment of separation.
Mr. Michel had been employed by Jefferson Standard Life Insurance
Company (Employer) for the duration of the marriage, but had separated
from the service of the Employer prior to January 1, 1984 (REA effective
date). As a former employee, Mr. Michel was not entitled to future
benefit accruals under the plan. The court did recognize Mrs. Michel's
community interest property right in the retirement plan benefits, but
again cited the ubiquitous "if and when payable" language of Sims.
'[Mrs. Michel] shall have a fifty percent (50%) interest in the ...
retirement plan ... to be paid only if and when such retirement is
paid."' 74
Unfortunately, the Michel record contains some inaccuracies as to
the pension benefits to which the husband is actually entitled. Whereas
the court addressed the issue of one retirement plan and separately
evaluated the treatment of the contributory and noncontributory portions
of the benefit in the one plan, Mr. Michel is actually a participant in
two Employer retirement plans, as evidenced by appellee's (Mrs. Mich-
el's) brief. 7"
Although the decision is known for the court's innovative evaluation
of the community interest in future novel royalties, that same innovative
approach was not extended to the pension issues. The court rejected
the appellee's attempt to distinguish the case on the basis of the par-
ticipant's separation from service. It stated that Mr. Michel's only vested
.,interest is the $2,334 attributable to Mr. Michel's contribution. But the
court noted that upon reaching age sixty-five, "he will be paid $1,318.99
per month until his death." ' 76 Since Mr. Michel had separated from
service, he must be vested in the "noncontributory" portion of his
benefit that was expected to yield $1,318.99 per month upon his attaining
normal retirement age. If his benefit were not vested prior to his ter-
mination, he would not be entitled to receive it upon retirement. Fur-
thermore, he had been employed since at least 1954, 77 and there are no
vesting schedules currently allowed by ERISA whereby a participant
could be denied vesting after the lengthy period of Mr. Michel's em-
ployment.78
74. Michel v. Michel, 484 So. 2d 829, 836 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986). See also, Henson
v. Henson, 499 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) (revised, on appeal, the
numerator of the Sims fraction by which the "defendant's interest in the plaintiff's
retirement benefits is to be computed, if and when they are paid") (emphasis added).
75. Brief for Appellee at 15, Michel v. Michel, 484 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1986) (No. 84-1308).
76. Michel, 484 So. 2d at 836.
77. Id. at 837.
78. 29 U.S.C.A. 1053(a) (West Supp. 1987).
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It is important to delineate the concepts of vesting and maturity.
Although Mr. Michel was vested in his benefit, it does not mature, i.e.
become payable, until his death, his permanent and total disability, or
his reaching "retirement age."
Pursuing further Mr. Michel's "retirement age," the court stated:
"Michel has no right to any payment unless and until he reaches age
65." 79 Most private, qualified retirement plans do offer early retirement
benefits. Examination of the two plan documents involved reveals that
both plans include an early retirement provision upon a participant's
attaining sixty years of age. Mr. Michel will be eligible for early re-
tirement in 1990.
The nature of the two plans in which Mr. Michel participates merits
further inquiry inasmuch as their different natures affect the "definite
determinability" of the provided benefits. One plan is a money purchase
pension plan. Since no further employer contributions are being made
on Mr. Michel's behalf, his "fund" is definitely determinable. The plan
document provides for crediting each participant's account annually with
a set formula, variable interest rate, which avoids the risk of plan losses
inherent in some defined contribution plans. Furthermore, the benefits
are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.80
The other plan in which Mr. Michel participates is a common defined
benefit pension plan. Since Mr. Michel has separated from service, his
"benefit formula result" (which is normally speculative when trying to
project a defined benefit value) is immutably set. The monthly benefit
formula in the plan for years of service after 1975 is 1/12 X 2% of
annual earnings. Since Mr. Michel is retired, he is accruing no further
benefit pursuant to the formula. Therefore, with a definitely determined
benefit to fund, his situation becomes analogous to evaluating a benefit
to be paid from a money purchase pension plan after termination of
service. The "benefit" (for a defined benefit plan) and the "fund" (for
a money purchase pension plan) is determined, and the ultimate benefit
varies depending only on the other actuarial assumptions, such as mor-
tality and post-retirement interest.
In Michel, the court was apparently unwilling to seize the opportunity
to distinguish pension plan benefits according to type of plans and
participant situations. Mr. Michel's "fund" in the money purchase pen-
sion plan was definitely determinable at the time of divorce. Upon his
termination from service, two factors in calculating the defined benefit
were set, namely his years of creditable service and his compensation.
Furthermore, the court did not consider the possibility of awarding Mrs.
79. Michel, 484 So. 2d at 836.
80. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1322 (Supp. 1987).
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Michel an interest in the pension plan survivor annuities should Mr.
Michel die before retirement.
Three recent Louisiana decisions indicate that some courts are ap-
proaching pension division on a more individualized, case-by-case basis.
In King v. King,8 the second circuit recognized that the value of the
husband's private defined benefit pension plan was community property.
The court, however, did not follow the reserved jurisdiction approach
but instead heard expert testimony from both parties' actuaries. The
court rejected the valuation of the husband's actuary, who had calculated
the benefit according to its liquidated value. The court accepted the
valuation offered by the wife's actuary, noting that he had calculated
the future benefit to be expected from the plan (upon husband's attaining
age sixty in 1997) with knowledge of the Sims formula. The court
actually assigned a specific amount to the community interest portion
of the future expected benefit based on the actuary's testimony. However,
in King there was no segregation of the wife's interest, nor recognition
of her right to elect payment of benefits according to her own preferred
schedule pursuant to a QDRO; rather, the court granted the wife, "one
half (YI) of the retirement benefits accrued up to the effective date of
the divorce as they are paid.' '82
The other two cases of interest are both decisions of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal. In Ramstack v. Krieger," the court divided
the community interest in three retirement plans pursuant to Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:2801. Two of the plans in which the husband was
a participant were government plans; the third was an account similar
to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA).84
Predictably, the court cited Sims to deny the ex-wife a current interest
in the two government plans since the husband had not yet retired. 5
However, the court noted that "the trial court was correct in treating
the Kemper [IRA] account as a present asset because, unlike the other
two retirement accounts, the money in the ... account can be withdrawn
at any time and therefore is reduceable [sic] to possession." '8 6 The court
was willing to classify the funds as reducible to possession even though
defendant would incur an income tax penalty if he withdrew the funds
before obtaining a certain age. The court's willingness to treat retirement
plan assets as present assets whenever they may be reduced to possession
is helpful for a non-employee spouse who requests a current distribution
81. 493 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
83. 470 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
84. The court does not disclose the exact nature of the retirement plan.
85. Id. at 166.
86. Id. at 167.
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of her interest. As will be more fully discussed below, plan proceeds
are often reducible to possession before a participant actually retires.
In Taylor v. Taylor,87 the court recognized the ability to value the
future benefit to be expected from a defined benefit pension plan with
sufficient precision to enable an immediate partition between the parties.
The court granted the wife an interest in a retirement plan that had
not been established until after the dissolution of the community, but
which included benefit accruals for periods during the existence of the
community. The court stated: "We recognize that this right is not
presently susceptible of precise monetary valuation. Nonetheless, the
parties may value the plan under the [Sims] formula, or they may agree
between themselves to assign a value for the purposes of effecting an
immediate partition."18
IV. SELECTED DECISIONS OF OTHER STATES
Recent decisions of other jurisdictions indicate that many courts do
analyze the type of pension plans involved, together with other relevant
factors, and ultimately assign a value to a pension benefit. Other courts
have been willing to direct distributions from a defined benefit plan to
a non-employee spouse years before the participant could retire. They
also have recognized pension plan survivor annuities as plan proceeds,
rather than as life insurance proceeds.
In Harman v. Harman,s9 the court was faced with conflicting ac-
tuarial testimony as to the value of pension benefits. The court stated:
"Before using pension rights as a basis for ...a monetary award, the
chancellor must properly value it upon consideration of the various
recognized alternative methods raised by the evidence."' 9 This decision
emphasizes the crucial role of the judge in ferreting out relevant pension
facts; it is often necessary for the judge to assume such a role when
facing complex and often conflicting facts and issues.
The court in Johnson v. Johnson9' noted an important policy reason
for assigning a current value to a pension benefit: the interest of the
state in finally disposing of the matter rather than supervising the parties
until the husband retires. The Arizona Supreme Court considered the
87. 473 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
88. Id. at 872. See also Succession of Tucker, 445 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1984) (court awarded ex-spouse a one-half interest in her husband's government retirement
plan benefits paid prior to his death where the original partition agreement had not
contemplated such benefits, but did not address the ex-spouse's potential interest in his
survivor annuity).
89. 61 Md. App. 554, 487 A.2d 689 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
90. Id. at 571, 487 A.2d at 698.
91. 131 Ariz. 38, 638 P.2d 705 (1981).
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community interest in the husband's vested profit sharing and defined
benefit pension plans accumulated during a fifteen year marriage. The
court noted that the husband had earned substantial benefits "through
his employment with a Tucson law firm." ' 92 The court thereby acknowl-
edged the practical fact that as a (probable) attorney, the husband likely
had a large degree of control over his employer's plans, i.e., he possibly
was or could expect to become a "key employee." 93 Although the
husband would not be eligible for early retirement for fifteen years, the
court assigned a value to both plans. The court noted that discounts
representing pre-retirement mortality and probability of vesting were
inapplicable since the participant was already vested. The court chose
to make a present award to the wife. The court stated:
In this case the present cash value method is clearly preferable
in that the reserved jurisdiction method would require continued
court supervision for at least 15 years. Moreover, the Johnsons'
marital estate has sufficient other property available to make a
current equitable division of all community property including
the wife's interest in the pension fund. 94
The Arizona Supreme Court in Koelsch v. Koelsch9l recognized the
inherent unfairness in a situation where the non-employee spouse is at
the mercy of an ex-spouse's retirement decision.
If the employee spouse chooses not to retire, he or she would
be liable to reimburse the non-employee spouse for the property
interest in the monthly pension benefit that is precluded by the
employee spouse's decision not to retire .... [T]he employee
spouse cannot unilaterally deprive the non-employee spouse of
his or her property. 96
Although the Koelsch case involved government pension plan ben-
efits, the principles are relevant to our inquiry. The court acknowledged
that the husband could not be forced to retire. To rectify any unfairness,
the court calculated a present value for the benefit and stated that the
husband could be required to pay the amount in a lump sum to the
wife. The court found the lump sum method to be preferable stating:
"It provides a clean break between the parties, it provides an unen-
cumbered pension plan to the employee, it relieves the. court of any
further supervision, and it relieves the retirement agencies of the duty
to pay benefits to anyone but the employee." ' 97
92. Id. at 40, 638 P.2d at 707.
93. I.R.C. § 416(i)(1) (Supp. 1987).
94. Johnson, 131 Ariz. at 42, 638 P.2d at 709.
95. 148 Ariz. 176, 713 P.2d 1234 (1986).
96. 713 P.2d at 1243.
97. 713 P.2d at 1241.
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The court further stated that if there was not sufficient property to
satisfy the lump sum obligation, the employee spouse could be ordered
to pay the non-employee spouse "a monthly amount equal to his or
her share of the benefit which would be received if the employee spouse
were to retire." '98 The court concluded that under very limited circum-
stances and within the trial court's discretion, the payments to the non-
employee spouse could be deferred. In such cases the court recommended
that the non-employee spouse's interest be protected either by a lien on
the participant's separate property or by an insurance policy. The court
suggested that in the latter situation, the participant should be required
to obtain an insurance policy in an amount sufficient to pay the deferred
payments with interest and to name the non-employee spouse as irrev-
ocable beneficiary. 99
As a retirement plan proceed, the right to receive the portion of
the death benefit or survivor annuity attributable to the marriage (that
portion earned during the existence of the community) should be ju-
dicially awarded to the ex-spouse pursuant to a QDRO upon divorce.
In Conn v. Trow'00 the court stated that pension plan death benefits
are not insurance but are "simply the property of the employee." The
court did not, however, award the ex-wife an interest in the death
benefit, because the parties had previously reached a final divorce set-
tlement in which the retirement plan was considered.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Judges should comply with REA's provisions when pension benefits
are divided pursuant to divorce in order to afford greater protection of
the non-employee spouse's property. Judges should eradicate the ubiq-
uitous "if and when payable" language that has formed the cornerstone
of the jurisprudentially created "pension doctrine." A properly drafted
QDRO will insure that a non-employee spouse, should she survive,
ultimately will receive a benefit from her ex-husband's retirement plan,
whether such benefit payment is precipitated by his termination from
service, his normal or early retirement, or his death.
There are three main aspects involved in judicial protection of an
ex-wife's property interest in the community portion of a retirement
benefit. First, judges should assign a value to a pension benefit and
direct its "immediate transfer" to the non-employee spouse whenever
feasible. If Congress did not believe those benefits to have an ascer-
tainable value it would not have included in REA provisions allowing
98. 713 P.2d at 1243.
99. Id.
100. 715 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tx. Ct. App. 1986).
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payment of pension benefits to an alternate payee before the participant
retires. 101
Judges should continue the practice begun in Taylor and King of
assigning a value to plan benefits at the time of divorce. A vested profit
sharing plan benefit, for most practical purposes, has a value equivalent
to the participant's account balance. The same is true for a money
purchase pension plan that offers a lump-sum distribution option. As-
signing a current value to a defined benefit pension plan is relatively
straightforward if the employee spouse has terminated service. The cal-
culation should also be reliable in a case involving a younger defined
benefit participant in certain occupations. An example is the Johnson
case, where the court valued the defined benefit of an attorney fifteen
years before retirement. It is likely that someone employed in a pro-
fessional or self-employed capacity will actually work for the employer
until retirement, thus, the actuarial factor of employer turnover is more
certain. Granted there is some speculation involved in such calculations,
but the law is often required to settle dynamic issues. The situation is
analogous to a personal injury case where courts are accustomed to
evaluating life expectancy and interest rates to arrive at a compensation
figure.
After assigning a value to a pension benefit, courts should direct
an "immediate transfer" of her interest to the non-employee spouse.
An "immediate transfer" could mean one of two things. First, the non-
employee spouse can be recognized as an alternate payee pursuant to
a QDRO by the pension administrator. 0 2 The pension administration
firm would then separate the participant's account into one account for
the participant and another for the non-employee spouse. The value of
such account would be fixed by the court's valuation of the benefit at
the time of divorce. The non-employee spouse then has the option of
electing her own retirement benefit options. Her options are still pred-
icated, however, on the rights of the participant.
For example, in the Michel situation, the pension administration
firm recognized the court's decision as a QDRO, and Mrs. Michel as
an alternate payee. 0 When Mr. Michel reaches his early retirement age
of sixty, Mrs. Michel can elect to "early retire" herself or she can wait
and receive increased benefits when Mr. Michel reaches age sixty-five.
She has a choice of payment options.
101. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(i)(1), (II) (Supp. 1987).
102. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(16)(A),(B) (Supp. 1987).
103. The author acknowledges the kind support of Allen M. Posey, Jr., attorney for
appellee, who made available pertinent information on the Michel case. Further inquiries
should be directed to the author.
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An "immediate transfer" could also mean that the court recognizes
the non-employee spouse's right to immediately receive the full value
of her pension benefit. She would then be free to make a tax-free
rollover of the distribution to her own qualified plan, such as an IRA.
This type of distribution would be appropriate in situations where a
plan allows benefits to be paid in the form of a lump sum distribution.
Profit sharing plans almost always provide a lump sum distribution
option. Money purchase pension plans usually provide such a option
and defined benefit plans sometimes do."° '
There are several policy reasons for effecting an immediate transfer
of interest to the non-employee spouse. In the first situation, where she
is recognized as an alternate payee by the pension administrator, she is
free to make her own retirement decisions based on her particular
financial situation. Although the participant may opt to work until or
even past normal .retirement age, the non-employee spouse may need
the money earlier. She can choose to begin receiving her portion of the
benefit, actuarially reduced for early payment, when or any time after
the participant attains early retirement age. She can also select the benefit
payment option most suited to her needs.
Public policy is also served when the non-employee spouse receives
a lump sum distribution which she can roll over to her own plan. Such
assets- are then within her own control in her capacity as manager or
administrator of the pension fund. Her assets are thereby protected from
certain risks inherent in having her funds retained by the employer's
pension plan. First, pension plan assets are sometimes endangered by
corporate mergers or takeovers. 05 Second, her rights in the plan are
predicated upon the employment of the participant. It is conceivable
that her interest could be endangered if the participant were denied
benefits pursuant to a "bad boy" clause. A "bad boy" clause is a plan
provision that requires forfeiture of a participant's benefit in certain
situations, such as for violation of a noncompetition clause or if he is
convicted of certain felonies." °6 If a plan provides for vesting more rapid
than that required by ERISA, a plan provision can require forfeiture
of such "excess vesting" for certain proscribed behavior. ERISA has
curtailed the viability of "bad boy" clauses, but they are still allowed
within certain limitations. "The employer's generosity entitles it to sub-
ject the 'excess' vested interest to any forfeiture conditions it chooses
to impose, including a 'bad boy' clause."' 07 If the non-employee spouse
104. See generally Canan, supra note 10 at ch. 3, §§ B, D.
105. J. Mamorskey, supra note 10 at ch. 29.
106. S. Kraus and R. Keschner, The Pension Answer Book, 76 (3d ed. 1984); Canan,
supra note 10 at ch. 17, § 8.3.
107. Montgomery v. Lowe, 507 F. Supp. 618, 621 (S.D. Tx. 1981).
[Vol. 48
COMMENTS
had already received her plan interest as a lump sum distribution, she
could not be harmed by the participant's subsequent deprivation of his
own interest pursuant to a "bad boy" clause. Third, as manager of
her own funds, the non-employee spouse would be better able to tailor
her investments to her needs. She could make more conservative in-
vestments than those which the plan administrator might make. De-
pending on her situation, she could invest in short-term or long-term
investments.1 0s
Perhaps the most compelling public policy reason for assigning a
value to a pension benefit and immediately transferring it by either
method to the non-employee spouse is that it disposes of the matter.
Under the reserved jurisdiction approach which Louisiana courts now
seem to be following, a divorce case involving pension benefits can be
effectively "pending" for years longer than if the pension issue had
been settled. The reserved jurisdiction approach requires prolonged in-
teraction of acrimonious parties. It also requires continued judicial in-
volvement in a primarily administrative matter. Such factors led the
Arizona Supreme Court in Johnson to choose the present cash value
method, noting that the reserved jurisdiction approach would require
court supervision for at least fifteen years until the participant would
be eligible for retirement.' °9
There are two potential types of costs involved in segregating the
non-employee spouse's interest. REA provides for charging the "ac-
count" of a participant and the non-employee spouse with the costs
involved in calculating and segregating the benefit. 1 0 The greater po-
tential cost to the plan results if excess benefits have been distributed
to the non-employee spouse. Such a situation could occur if one-half
of a participant's benefit is distributed to the non-employee spouse and
then part of the participant's benefit is forfeited pursuant to a "bad
boy" clause. It is important to remember that, except in limited situa-
tions, an employer cannot retract money that it has contributed to a
retirement plan."' The money which would have gone to erroneously
pay the non-employee spouse is no longer money of the employer, but
of the pension fund. Although the employer could be required to fund
the deficiency, there are often forfeitures within a plan that could be
used for that purpose. In essence, courts have the opportunity to allocate
the risk of an excess payment to either the pension plan or to the non-
108. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104 (Supp. 1987) (fiduciary duties).
109. Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 42, 638 P.2d 705, 709 (1981).
110. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(2) (Supp. 1987).
111. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1344(d) (Supp. 1987) (provision for reversion of assets to the
employer after plan termination and satisfaction of all participant obligations, in limited
situations).
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employee spouse. It seems that the pension plan is in a much better
position to bear that risk.
In all cases where the non-employee spouse does not receive a lump
sum distribution of her pension benefits, courts should take care to
safeguard her interest in the event she is predeceased by the participant.
As noted earlier, the court in T.L. James recognized a pension plan
death benefit to be a plan proceed rather than life insurance. As such,
courts should provide by QDRO that an ex-wife be entitled to that
portion of the husband's survivor annuity or death benefit earned during
the community as calculated by application of the Sims formula. This
approach was contemplated by Congress, as REA specifically provides
for recognition of a former spouse as a cur-rent spouse for the purposes
of the QJ&S and QPS annuities.1 2
Such recognition of an ex-wife's interest in the survivor annuity or
death benefit is crucial to her ability to plan for her retirement. What
will Mrs. Michel do if Mr. Michel dies before attaining retirement age
and electing to receive benefits? She will probably find herself in the
same situation as Mrs. Sims, receiving the value of one-half of the
contributions made to the plans during the community, which is usually
worth far less than the survivor annuity or death benefit.
In summary, for reasons of judicial economy, courts should be
willing to assign a value to a pension benefit and immediately transfer
that interest to the non-employee spouse upon divorce whenever feasible.
If benefits are not distributed in a lump sum to the non-employee
spouse, courts should provide that the non-employee spouse be entitled
to a portion of the plan death benefit or survivor annuity should the
participant predecease her. Such recommendations seem clearly com-
patible with the Congressional intent evidenced by REA. Such recom-
mendations are also compatible with Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801,
by which the court partitions community property pursuant to a divorce.
Such recommendations will allow the non-employee spouse to ra-
tionally and reasonably plan for her future. She will not be at the mercy
of an ex-spouse's unilateral retirement decision. She can select the time
when her own benefits become payable, regardless of whether the ex-
spouse decides to work until or even past normal retirement age. She
will also be assured of a continued benefit in the event that her ex-
spouse predeceases her.
Elizabeth Alford Beskin
112. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(F)(i) (Supp. 1987).
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